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M. David Eckersley 
Attorney for Defendant 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY 
510 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-0453 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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1CAROL HOFFMAN, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S CITATION OF 
NEWLY UNCOVERED AUTHORITY 
vs. 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 18184 
Plaintiff and appellant Carol Hoffman hereby requests 
the Clerk of the Court, pursuant to Rule 75(p) (3) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to include in appellant's brief, at 
page 18, line 11, the following argument and authorities newly 
uncovered by appellant's counsel, said authorities being in 
support of Point II of appellant's original brief: 
On the analogous question of how an insured's mental 
impairment should be applied with regard to a policy provision 
excluding coverage for injuries caused by the insured's own 
intentional conduct, courts have now almost uniformly adopted 
the rule that an intentional conduct exclusion cannot be used 
··~'I 
I"' i'. ~I} 
to deny coverage to a mentally impaired insured. For instance, 
in Glo·be Americ·an ca·s·.· co·.· v.· Lyons, 131 Ariz. 337, 641 P.2d 
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251 (Ariz. Appl. 1982), the court was presented with a case 
where the insured drove her vehicle directly into a pickup 
truck occupied by others. When the occupants filed suit against 
the insured, the company sought a declaration that they had no 
coverage for the risk because the accident was the product of 
the insured's intentional conduct for which an exclusion existed. 
Despite psychiatric testimony showing the insured to have been 
suffering from severe mental illness at the time of the accident, 
the trial court entered judgement for the company on the basis 
of the intentional conduct exclusion. The Court of Appeals 
reversed, noting that "to hold, as appellees urge, that mental 
illness is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether an 
act is "intentional" is inconsistent with long standing policy 
considerations in insurance law." 641 P.2d at 253. Instead, 
the court chose to adopt the holding of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Ruvolo v. American ca·s·. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 189 A.2d 204 
(1963), as follows: 
We hold that if the insured was suffering from 
a derangement of his intellect which deprived him 
of the capacity to govern his conduct in accor-
dance with reason and while in that condition [acted] 
on an irrational impulse ••• his act cannot be 
treated as "intentional" within the connotation 
of defendant's insurance contract. 
189 A. 2d at 208-09. See also,· Congregation of Rodef Shalom of 
·Marin v. American Motcr·i·sts Tn·s·. Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 690, 154 
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1979); Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Dunkel 363· so.2d 190 (Fla. 1978). 
Appellant submits that the same policy considerations 
which would preclude application of an intentional conduct 
exclusion to a mentally impaired insured militate against holding 
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a mentally impaired insured responsible for the "foreseeable" 
consequences of his actions. 
DATED this J/J ti. day of December, 1982. 
MAILING CERTIFTCATE 
I certify that a correct and true copy of the foregoing 
was sent to the following this· ·!)..q-14"' day of December, 1982. 
H. James Clegg 
Henry K. Chai II 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange 'Place, Fourth Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
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